Jane DOE: The following podcast was released in 2021 on a separate platform. IC leadership, thought leadership, titles, current events, and technology may have changed and evolved since its original release.

Anna Puglisi: ... let me be clear, China's policies says that it will use any knowledge or technology it acquires for its military. And it's not conjuncture, it's not profiling or analysis. It's China's stated position for decades. And the real difference is that citizens, businesses, and universities, in China, they can't say no. And that's baked into their national security laws, as well as their cybersecurity law.

The opinions and views expressed in the following podcast do not represent the views of NIU or any other U.S. government entity. They are solely the opinions and views of Jane Doe, and her guests. a mention of organizations, publications, or products not owned or operated by the U.S. government is not a statement of support and does not constitute U.S. government endorsement.

(Intelligence Jumpstart Intro Music)

Jane DOE: Welcome back to the Intelligence Jumpstart; I am your host, Jane DOE. On this episode, NIU’s VP of Research and Infrastructure, Manolis Priniotakis, came back to the Intelligence Jumpstart to speak with Anna Puglisi about China’s competitive and innovative edge on S&T education and development.
Anna Puglisi is a Senior Fellow at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET). Previously she served as the National Counterintelligence Officer for East Asia, advising senior U.S. and foreign government officials at the highest levels, academia, and the private sector on counterintelligence (CI) issues. She played a prominent role in drafting the most recent U.S. National Counterintelligence Strategy and designing mitigation strategies for the public and private sectors to protect technology.

As a member of the Senior Analytic Service, she developed multidisciplinary efforts to understand global technology developments and their impact on U.S. competitiveness and national security, as well as efforts to target U.S. technology.

Anna has co-authored two books, including Chinese Industrial Espionage and China’s Quest for Foreign Technology.

Manolis Priniotakis: Anna Puglisi, welcome to NIU’s Intelligence Jumpstart.

Anna Puglisi: Thank you … it’s a pleasure to be here.

Manolis Priniotakis: Thanks for being part of our inaugural season. We might as well just jump right into things. You recently testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on China's S&T strategy - and a challenge to the US. And you spent some time talking about the differences in our systems that they, the Chinese have a different system with different values. Can you explain what you meant by that in the context of science and technology and really why it matters?

Anna Puglisi: Sure. I think that's a really fundamental piece in understanding some of the behaviors that we're seeing and some of the challenges. China's central government policies and the role of the state really create this different system. What really underlies that is … includes talent programs that exploit China's diaspora, S&T development programs with acquisition strategies that are built straight into them, and China's policy on civil-military fusion.

And that one I think we hear a lot about. There's a huge discussion about exactly what it means. And there's often a lot of debate or a lot of commentary on – “Well, you know, our universities work with our military, or our businesses work with our military.” But, let me be clear, China's policies says that it will use any knowledge or technology it acquires for its military. And it's not conjuncture, it's not profiling or analysis. It's China's stated position for decades. And the real difference is that citizens, businesses, and universities, in China, they can't say no. And that's baked into their national security laws, as well as their cybersecurity law.

Manolis Priniotakis: So, in terms of comparisons to other places, the US for instance, you talked about companies, universities, working with the government. But the key difference is, you know, the Chinese really have to respond to government demands, as do any companies operating in China.

Anna Puglisi: Right. I mean, we're seeing the largest crackdown on civil society in China, especially under Xi, since 1989. It’s important to remember that … the kind of authoritarian government that we're dealing with here.

Manolis Priniotakis: And, fundamentally, this system then, is effectively at odds with the key assumptions of a globalized economy - open markets, reciprocity, transparency, sharing of scientific information … these things run counter to effectively what that system represents. Is that a fair way of putting it?

Anna Puglisi: I would think that's a fair way to put it. I mean, China's central government policies and programs really undermine the global norms of commerce and collaboration. And science, basically. And part of it is because China's really engaged in a strategic rivalry with the US … that its management with the US has really been designed to mask key aspects of that rivalry. And that's part of the part that makes these discussions so difficult, and also hides those differences in the system.

And, when you look at these programs, and these policies that have been put in place … and I say, these are not new policies and programs … a lot of the same themes we've seen over decades of that strive to really take a zero-sum view of collaborations. And so, seek them out to fill strategic gaps in China's not only military modernization but economic development … seek to leverage and really use its market to acquire that technology and technological now how.

Manolis Priniotakis: You mentioned Xi looking at technology as a zero-sum … or technology competition, maybe a better way of putting it - as a zero-sum game. Is he wrong? Is it not dissimilar to a sort of Cold War competition? And in some ways, you think about like - even the Atoms for Peace concept, there was a sharing of technology, but at the same time … I was looking the other day at the National Security Act of 1947 … the original text … which by the way, is remarkable, in that it's only 16 pages long. But one of the pages is devoted to the stand-up of a research and development board - which was really focused on the development of technology for national security and assessment of technology. So, given where the Chinese, you know, are in their own development … putting yourself in
his shoes. Is it a …? Is it a wrong position to be taking, to be looking at technology competition as a zero-sum game?

Anna Puglisi: Well, I think what we have to think about is not necessarily whether it's right or wrong, but how do we engage in that kind of … or with that kind of a system. How do we then, as an open liberal democracy … both ourselves, our allies, and like-minded… think about both protecting the system and the values we hold dear. And not shutting our doors to China, but thinking about, okay, when we enter into these engagements, we go into them with the eyes wide open. That is the ultimate goal of this collaboration, as opposed to the research itself, or an open fair level playing field.

Manolis Priniotakis: In terms of global collaboration, or at least maybe a better way of looking at it is the potential for China's integration into the global economic system. Going back about 15 years there seemed to be an underlying assumption that the integration of China into the global economic system would change it. That these behaviors would modify, in one way, shape or form. Of course, hindsight is always 2020. But looking back, was that effectively an incorrect assumption or faulty analysis?

Anna Puglisi: I would venture to say that was a faulty analysis. And the hope … right, of wanting China to enter as a responsible player as a responsible stakeholder into the world community. And so those assumptions that you talk about, I've written quite a bit about. I call them the myth of the stateless global society. And assuming, and we still hear that, when we treat China as a neutral actor … that in order to be innovative, you have to have a democracy … that as China became more capable and became richer, that, automatically they become more democratic and more open. And that those irritants in the relationship such as market access, IP theft, the leveraging of collaborations, and basically, targeting of technology would, would all kind of fall by the wayside. But unfortunately, what we've seen is a doubling down on that. And, you know, as China's become more capable and stronger, especially using its economic clout, to actually silence its critics, in a lot of ways, and use that strength to leverage not only U.S. businesses, but you see what some of the challenges that some of our European allies and friends are having.

Manolis Priniotakis: There's some surprise that an authoritarian government has been able to continue to develop an innovation society and technology ecosystem. I'm reminded of a book that was written at the end of World War II, by the man who led the US mission to try to figure out whether or not the Germans were developing a nuclear bomb … Samuel Goudsmit, in this book Alsos about the Alsos mission. And one of the things he talks about extensively is the faults during World War II of this authoritarian system where everybody was afraid to question the leaders and especially the great man. The issue was Werner Heisenberg not having, having made some mistakes, and now nobody wanted to question him that technology and innovation cannot flourish in an authoritarian system. I think the Soviets proved that this is not necessarily true, there was a great deal of technology advancement under the Soviet system. So, as the Chinese have continued to develop their culture of innovation, is it surprising that this has been able to persist even under this system?

Anna Puglisi: So, I always … as some of the listeners out there are gonna be familiar with, I usually talk about my myths of … that innovation is always the elephant in the room when we talk about China. And I talk about what I call my myths of China's S&T development because that's a really important point. And I think how you view whether China is innovative or not, impacts the risk calculation. And that's not only for our policymakers, but for you know, our academics and for our businesspeople, because, you know, if you inherently believe someone is not innovative, or five to ten years behind, then, you know, the kind of deal that you're willing to make … or the collaborations that you're willing to have are very different. Because of the assumptions that are baked into that.

And I think that in some ways, it's hubris. My personal favorite of those is that we'll always out-innovate them. I mean, I know we hear that quite a bit from our business community, as well as our academics. But it's important to note that the emphasis that the Chinese government has put on S&T development, from its opening, and we've really seen it in stages, you know, and that's not to say that China is 20 feet tall across the board, because it is a very stratified system. But when you look back to think about the 1980s… or right around 1980, that, you know, coming out of the Cultural Revolution that universities were essentially shut down. Right. And a whole swath of the population didn't really attend a university. And over the last several decades of fundamental foundational investments … first in capital projects … I, myself, having studied there in the late 90s, seeing revitalization at some of those universities … and really the seeds of some of these talent programs. Returnees have always been a central part of China's development strategies. But you started to see that take off a little bit more in the late 90s because there was more for them to come back to.

So, I think the university that I studied at … that was particularly striking when I was there was really onesies and twosies. Right? So, one person in each of the sciences … and this is in the sciences, this is not, we're not talking about some of the social sciences, but the hard sciences. But you know, when you have one or two people in a department, that's not going to change the culture of the department that might change the culture in that lab … and I did see that that was very different. But the subsequent policies, you know, fast forward ten years that same university had over 200 faculty, 20 new Deans, and the university president, that was a returnee. And you see that across multiple of the high-tier universities in China.

And so, it's building that foundation, and it's brick by brick. And so oftentimes, again, we'll also hear, “well, you know, doesn't matter if China gets “x” or China gets “y,” because that's not the most cutting edge. But the way China talks about innovation … that's why it's really important to read not only the English but also the Chinese language material. It encompasses three different definitions. It's what we think about is cutting edge and bleeding edge. But it's also new to China, and also new to China in modified. So, when you look at the landscape, of all three of those definitions that incorporates … that includes quite a bit.

And to expand a little bit more too … that what China has done, as well … and we hear this from a lot of our own faculty members is they really have won, in some ways, the PR war of saying that they are very pro-science. And so, the facilities, the new facilities that are going in, whether it be sequencing capacity, light sources, there are these big science facilities… they’re an attraction to world-class scientists. And that also, you know, if the science isn't there quite yet. They're key enablers for that future discovery.

Manolis Priniotakis: So now that you're in academia, you're interacting with academics, and I've seen you interact with academics in other settings. Have you seen over the last maybe decade, academia's views of the Chinese presence, or at least the relationships with either Chinese scholars or the Chinese government evolve over time?

Anna Puglisi: Well, I think all of the foundation and the foundational investments that we've seen the Chinese government put into its S&T foundation, have really, built Chinese science. And you see an increasing profile of, you know, world-class scientists across the board across multiple disciplines. And, of course, you know, our academics want to collaborate with that excellence. That's what we want, we want both the best and brightest to come here and stay as well as to, you know, to engage in collaborations and that's really the basis of science. I think where the challenge comes … and it comes back to one of your initial questions … is the difference in the system. And you know, how that impacts the ability of individual scientists or even individual institutions to have independent collaborations or interactions when the pressure from the central government, and these policies, incentivize them to do different kinds of things.

And I think that's one of the messages and one of the challenges that we have, and we've seen play out, you know, with the questions about the Department of Justice’s China initiative, and some of the discussions about okay, how we implement research security … whether it be new legislation or existing grants.

So, I think this is a really important point, because, you know, there really is there's no room for xenophobia or ethnic profiling in the US. It really goes against everything that we have stood for as a nation. But precisely because of these values, we really need to find a principal way forward in dealing with China's central government policies. And by pretending that the systems are the same, we do a disservice to Chinese scientists that are wanting to do the right thing … because of the pressure we can't possibly understand that the Chinese government can place on them. And I think that's one of the challenges in having open conversations and talking about these differences so that our own academics can understand kind of some of those challenges.

Manolis Priniotakis: So, with our own academics … I mean, there's the understanding the pressures that the Chinese are under, but there's also they have their own pressures at home. Right? To publish to advance their own research. And recently I had a conversation with an engineering professor at a prominent U.S. university, who was asked about … or knows that there are questions about, you know, so many of the STEM students coming from overseas. And one of the things that she said was, that she had colleagues from China, from Iran, from India. Some were U.S. citizens, some were not.

But when it comes to recruiting accepting doctoral students, they understand the good programs in those countries. They may know the faculty members. They know that they're going to get somebody who's going to help them advance their own research and advance their own careers. In a way that she said most U.S. academics don't even understand. That you may get a student applying from you know, any of the many engineering programs around the country. There are some that are obviously better known than others, but somebody coming from a smaller program may be a good student, but they don't really have that sense. It's just that there's a broad … and maybe as education expanded, especially in China, it's not as easy as it once was. But they said she didn't blame her colleagues for accepting primarily students from programs that they understood, well. And also, maybe had, you know, language in common and so forth. Do you see that as a factor on how US academics or maybe interacting with, with students from other countries in particular from China?

Anna Puglisi: Right, so I think it really hits on the point of … one of the recommendations I often make when I'm asked about, “Okay, so how do we start to mitigate or deal with the challenge of China,” … is really looking about improving ourselves. And we really need to invest in the future and recognize that includes students, that includes the STEM pipeline. We, here in the US have, no secret that you know, that it's a leaky pipeline. And, you know, we have whole swaths of our, our own populations that are underrepresented in these programs. You know to have a technically proficient workforce, and also to be able to participate in industries of the future, is a challenge. And that's not to say that we don't want the best and brightest from all over.

I think one of the challenges with some of these talent programs is what we've seen, and it's been documented, in some of the literature … is part of the stipulations on some of these programs is that they take students, take postdocs from specific entities in China. And so, if that is the case, that means the opportunity costs … we're not necessarily getting the best and brightest, even from those countries. We're getting who the Chinese government wants to put in those labs. And considering only 10% of Ph.D. students are self-funding … that's a lot of US taxpayer money.

Manolis Priniotakis: Yeah, it’s interesting. That conversation with her was specifically about doctoral students. The interesting aspect of one of the interesting aspects of the conversation was at the master’s level … you say only 10% of doctoral students are self-funding, and most master's students are self-funded. And then that's a pathway to doctoral programs. And so, they're their sources of revenue, or for these programs at the master’s level. So, again, I guess may be the same challenge. It's the students that are being selected to be sent over to participate in these programs.

Anna Puglisi: But you see that with postdocs as well. Right? I think one of the challenges … I mean, not only at universities but even at some of the government labs such as the DoD labs that the willingness to accept salaries especially If you're already subsidized by another government, that would be so would not be sustaining for an American postdoc or someone that doesn't have that same subsidy. And so, when we talk about … and also, how do you approach or start to deal with some of these, these challenges … is looking at what is the true cost, from an administrative perspective. Because in a lot of cases, the principal investigator is not paying that administrative cost. They're only paying what they see upfront. And so that creates a little bit more of a challenge and an unequal playing field.

(Manolis Minute Intro Music)

Manolis Priniotakis (20:05): I’m Manolis Priniotakis, NIU’s Vice President for Research & Infrastructure and this is this episode’s Manolis Minute.

I hope you have enjoyed our inaugural season, which included thought leaders from inside and outside of the IC. Over the past seven episodes, you heard from a range of thinkers and experts from academia, industry, and government – hosted by members of the NIU community. For this episode, I want to spend a minute on NIU.

NIU has a history going back six decades, mostly with the Department of Defense but, since 2010 formally and 2021 organizationally, with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. NIU has had multiple names over its years of existence, and faculty and staff measure their longevity by how many acronyms under which they’ve served … most recently, the National Defense Intelligence College, or NDIC, and before that, the Joint Military Intelligence College, or JMIC.

Since 2010, we’ve been the National Intelligence University, with the establishment of a second school within the university and a formal transfer of authority to ODNI with the Defense Intelligence Agency serving as executive agent.

The combined efforts of NIU, DIA, and ODNI, after a legal transfer by Congress and approval by the Department of Education and NIU’s accreditors, led to an organizational move in 2021. So, we’ve been NIU ever since 2010 and we think this name will stick.

(Manolis Minute Exit Music)

Thanks again for listening to Intelligence Jumpstart, and I hope you enjoyed this inaugural season. We look forward to bringing you another season soon. For more information on NIU, please visit our website, www.ni-u.edu. Drop us a line if you have any ideas for future episodes.

Manolis Priniotakis: I guess at the same time, we talked about some of the funding that comes with people … or at least comes from the Chinese government … have seen some trend in recent years of … in particular on things like the Confucian Institutes of universities now turning back some of those programs and some of that funding. Is that based on a broader understanding by universities of the potential threats or problems that they that these programs bring with them?

Anna Puglisi: The Confucius Institutes are, but rarely do we see that involved with STEM. So, some of the challenges with the Confucius Institutes … not so much here in the US, but we were seeing, in the EU, where universities were no longer having their own faculty members that actually teach the Chinese language, or Chinese language and culture. And so, you had entities fully funded by the Chinese government, and the Chinese Ministry of Education, putting forth a curriculum at these universities and teaching all of the students a foreign language.

And then the concern of the role that some of these Institute's and their faculty … their teachers play in some of the pushback that we were seeing on college campuses … whether it be the Dalai Lama coming to visit, or discussions regarding Taiwan, Xinjiang … and really that kind of challenge to that academic freedom and freedom of speech.

So, that's one area where I believe was one of some of the drivers for campuses to no longer have those Confucius Institutes on their, on their campus. On the other hand, what we were seeing with some of the funding for … in the STEM are increasingly …, especially at some of the top universities … are fully funded postdocs fully funded graduate students. And not only the fully funding, but then also extra funding for the research. And science is an international endeavor, that's fine. It's the transparency issue that really comes down. And so, if you see a lot of the more recent conversations are just sciences open. It's about collaboration, it's about transparency and reciprocity, then those foreign sources of funding should be disclosed.

Manolis Priniotakis: Well, I guess that gets us into a phrase that you used in your testimony, and, you know, made its way into the last administration's National Security Strategy of nontraditional collectors. Can you describe what you mean by nontraditional collectors?

Anna Puglisi: Sure. So, this is, I think, one of the things that really gets at the human cost of China's behavior. And I think one of the biggest challenges to understanding the scale and scope of China's actions and really designing mitigation strategies because is something that is very, very different than what the US has had to face before. And really, our system isn't set up for it. You mentioned earlier, what science was like during the days of the Soviet Union. And, and, you know, we think back that our counterintelligence systems are actually still set up traditionally for that … where it was a big focus on intelligence officers, a big focus on military end use, things that are illegal, things or have a direct military application.

But what we see what China doing is very different. China leverages and uses its scientists, its students, businesspeople, and particularly those who are ten different research projects and industry to target the technology and the technological information. This is not analysis. This is, again, you mentioned being able to go in and actually look at Chinese language policies and programs. These are programs that we see the Chinese government has had on the books, since the early 90s.

There are things called two bases, where you can have one base in the country where you're studying, and one base in China … serve China by multiple means. This means that you don't just have to return you can actually, you can sponsor students, you can apply for funding where you are currently working and use that to serve and fill gaps in China. You can help people get visas; you can broker introductions.

And then one of the other policies that we have seen reflected throughout the Chinese language policies and programs. Again, since the early 90s, is one that's called serve in place. And that means you don't have to return you can stay where you are and serve the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government. And that makes it very challenging because that's something that we don't think about, as Americans … that someone that we know, that has been welcomed here, who's lived here, is often either a U.S. person or the US participating … or are part of a central government program to undermine that, you know, our openness.

Manolis Priniotakis: You mentioned a number of different programs that have been around for quite a long time. And I know you've spoken publicly about a complementary web of, programs, and policies. Is it a complementary web? Or is it … is it really that organized?

Anna Puglisi: It's actually, it's very interesting, I think a recent work that we just did that talked about … it had a catchy title called, China's Tech Wishlist. It talks about the S&T diplomats. And what's very striking, is the bureaucracy, both in China and out of China we call the advocacy groups that we see and these S&T diplomats throughout the world that are put in place to actually facilitate these programs and policies. So, there's a lot of forethought that goes into that. And the pipeline. So, from being an entity in China, where you can fill out a form that goes into a central repository … tells what kind of technology or kind of person you're looking for … that then goes to the Ministry of Science and Technology, that then goes out globally to different Embassies. And then the introductions.

And that's not to say there's a big puppet master in Beijing controlling all of this, because I think that's also one of the challenges of you know, of the system. Oftentimes, when we get asked, “Okay, well, what's the list,” everyone always wants the list … comes back to those nontraditional collectors that … so it’s the people that are experts that are working on those programs. They know exactly where … whatever they need to fill a gap, or what kind of equipment that they need to get to that next level? And that makes it challenging.

What we uncovered with this report, as well, is because you're using experts, right … you're not playing telephone. You don't have a non-technical person … either an intelligence officer or case officer, asking somebody technical questions. These are the experts in those fields. And so, they have a nuanced understanding of not only what lab, but sometimes what person they want in that lab with the required expertise.

Manolis Priniotakis (29:08): In that same report … I think you talk about the Ministry of Science and Technology’s overseas activities, and you seem to have relied on these … I think what you were just referencing is international technology cooperation opportunities. Am I getting that right? So maybe you can describe the methodology a little bit more on how you put together this story.

Anna Puglisi (29:31): Sure. So, we actually looked at … these are actual Chinese language documents by the Ministry of Science and Technology and other parts of the bureaucracy … and what was striking was how we actually put together the pipeline or the flowchart because we actually found a flowchart where China itself described this process. And it showed how the inputs came in, where the outputs went out and how the different parts work together. And that graphic is actually in the report.

Manolis Priniotakis: Well, you described in the report that about half of the opportunities were in Russia, the US, the UK, and Japan. And really only I think it's 12% in the US. So that other 50%, that's a fairly large amount that. You know, so this is not just an “us problem,” this is a global issue. Correct?

Anna Puglisi: And that's an excellent point. And that's why working with our allies, or partners, like-minded is so important, to highlight this kind of counter-competitive behavior.

Manolis Priniotakis: You mentioned a myth of Chinese innovation earlier, but maybe this brings us to an earlier myth. It reminds me of I think, a 19th-century mission, the myth of the Chinese market. Right. That everybody was always going to sell something to China. I think there was some kind of crass phrases. Everybody in China added a quarter inch, I said, everybody in China, as opposed to the phrase at the time … everybody in China added a quarter inch to their shirt, it would make, you know, make millionaires of people in Manchester … garment manufacturers in Manchester.

But now with the … you talked about the ability to fund not only students but also provide additional funding for the researchers … there is a level of economic mites given the economic trajectory of China over the last several decades. How much of a sort of core factor is that? The one … the sort of economic, maybe stability … is as a good word to use or success. I know that there are still hundreds of millions of rural subsistence farmers and hundreds of millions of urban poor. But there is a level of disposable income for another several 100 or a few 100 million people in a way that there really wasn't before. So how big of a factor is the internal Chinese marketplace now as a sort of underlying base support for the government … but also its ability to, you know, spread money overseas, whether it's through belt road or other overseas engagements?

Anna Puglisi: Right. And that’s an excellent point. And I often also highlight … of course, people are still making money. But I think as we were challenged, and as we are thinking about, okay, what is the long-term implications of some of these policies and programs? It's okay, how do we take a step back and ensure that, that there will be manufacturing or there will be capabilities sustained in … in the U.S. economy?

I think one of the things that are really important to highlight is China's strategic emerging industries programs and policies. So, they actually talk about this, and the importance of the China market, to these emerging areas. And it includes, it includes everything. It's very, very broad categories, everything from biotech to telecommunications, to new materials, new energy vehicles, batteries, things like that.

But what's striking is China actually articulates the importance of winning the China market first. And so, you know, while it's a huge market, and people have made a lot of money … we're not dealing on an open and level playing field. And there's not … Chinese companies or American companies don't have the same market access, and freedom of movement, as Chinese companies do have here, in the US, or in Europe.

And so, what China talks about is the importance of competition amongst its own companies, building up those national champions, winning the China market first, and using that to kind of springboard out. And I think Huawei is a great example of that. You know, there are always so many jokes about the quality of Huawei technology and nothing to worry about, nothing to see here. You know, you see a slow progression or, a very methodical progression from the 80s, the 90s, now to where we find ourselves now … without a clear 5G tech US, or a trusted partner brand, from, that we can do end to end solutions. And it's it follows that playbook of winning the China market first, being able to sell … in a lesser market … building out that capabilities, putting everybody else out of business. Basically, leveraging the strength of the state and the subsidies.

Manolis Priniotakis: And yet, especially in recent months, there's been what appears to be some reluctance on the part of the Chinese government about this ability of some of these companies to operate overseas. We see the restrictions on accessing U.S. capital markets for some companies. We frankly saw the disappearance of Jack Ma, who had been a, I guess, in theory still is a prominent, maybe the most prominent Chinese businessman in the world, and effectively is gone from the scene.

I was talking to somebody the other day who joked … finally, you know, there's something that the U.S. members of … the U.S. Senate and Xi Jinping can agree on … that neither of them wants some Chinese companies accessing the U.S. capital market. But at the same time, I was looking at an investment report from a U.S. State Pension Fund recently, and you know, their investments, by my count 172 different Chinese companies worth billions of dollars. And that's, frankly, just the ones that had China in their name, because that was … it was just easier to sort that way. I'm guessing that there were several 100 more. So, you know, in the strange situation where these companies that have made that strengthen domestically and then … of listed overseas with state employees funding Chinese private development, through the holding of Chinese investments, it creates a, an unusual situation for, for us to be in.

Anna Puglisi: It does. And I think that comes back to a part of our original conversation about the importance of recognizing how different the systems are. We think about the assumptions, the underlying assumptions that have been made, especially the listing of some of these companies … that they were going to act like that … because they look like they act like something that we're familiar with. And in many cases, up until now, it's seemingly has been that way. But the transparency reporting requirements of a lot of these companies, and really having the same transparency of their books, as opposed to say, you know, U.S. company that links those lists, just has not been the same.

And so, I think, you know, this is kind of a cautionary tale, not only for the individual Chinese companies, and of course, the individuals. Think about the implications of … we talked about individual scientists, individual students, and individual businesspeople being able to stand up or say no to the Chinese government. Here, you have a billionaire running this major global international tech company, who runs afoul and, and can't do that.

So, I think again, it comes back to, you know, really acknowledging that our systems are not the same. And I think in my testimony I talk about … we have to face the facts that Beijing doesn't play by free-market rules, it doesn't respect IP, and it's willing to act directly … indirectly … in a way to ensure its favorite companies when in the market. And, you know, we often hear … and I can't begin to tell you how many times even from, from the late 80s … well China would never do “x” because it's worried about the repercussions or it's worried about fill in the blank. And every step along the way there … the cost has been low or nonexistent. And so, they keep marching on.

Manolis Priniotakis: Keep marching on … Well, recently Xi Jinping gave this speech, which had this remarkable phrase that at least as was translated, as you know, the Chinese people will never allow any foreign forces to bully, coerce, or enslave us. Whoever attempts to do that will surely break their heads on the steel great wall built with the blood and flesh of 1.4 billion Chinese people. And also, he gave the speech wearing, you know, fashions favored by Mao … there's not a lot of subtlety here. This is not, you know, Dengs’ hide and bide. This was a much more confrontational in-your-face approach, and I guess they're at that point where they are able to do that.

Anna Puglisi: Yes. You know there's been multiple debates. Yeah, no, no, there's been lots of debate about how that was translated, but I think you make an excellent point, and also a very important point of going back to hide and bide. Again, reading the Chinese language material, these sentiments have been articulated for decades. And with technology, it's not a new thing. It's a … this is also something that we've seen, you know when we talk about the idea of a zero-sum. So, in addition to Xi, the most recent that was very colorful in relation to technology … you know, Xi has talked about this since May of 2018 … that need to seize the commanding heights of technological innovation … that AI is a vital driving force for a new round of technological revolution and industrial reform and that China must control AI and ensure it securely kept in their own hands. That science and technology is a national weapon. If China wants to be strong, it must have powerful science and technology.

And this is actually one of my favorites that S&T innovations become critical support for increasing comprehensive national strength and that whoever holds the key to S&T innovation, makes an offensive move in a chess game in S&T innovation and will be able to preempt its rivals and win advantages. Now, this is all happening when our own discussions around S&T are kind of doubling down on our view of collaboration as an open endeavor, and doubling down on the values of transparency, reciprocity, openness … global collaboration as a fundamental driver for this. So, again, a very, very different approach to some of these, some of these areas.

Manolis Priniotakis: And that comes back to something you talked about earlier. I guess one of the challenges, the US perspective of addressing all this … you used the word xenophobia, in an early part of this discussion. And I know you recently started your testimony to the Senate with a pretty remarkable statement about your own grandparents having been immigrants … who came to the country with little formal education, worked menial jobs, and made a new life for themselves. And that, “I want to start with saying that there is no room for xenophobia or ethnic profiling in the US. It goes against everything we've stood for, as a nation …” It was very personal and very pointed. And I guess, why did you feel you need to start off that way?

Anna Puglisi: Because I think it's important that we remember why … the importance of immigrants to our nation, and the role that we need to have immigration and not ignore the contributions of those who have come before me … before that.
And I think that's what makes it so challenging as Americans. Because China's policies and programs, in some ways, seek to exploit our challenges …. our differences … and that we have to have open … and it's gonna make us uncomfortable, when we have these kinds of conversations are going to make us very uncomfortable. Because it's challenging. But we can't ignore the policies, the challenges … and I said this in my statement … created by this nation-state, you know, that is ever more authoritarian that doesn't share our values. And has a different system and different regard for human rights. And it’s really important … despite … in some ways, you know, China has definitely won the PR war with that and presenting itself as being pro-science along with the other, because it has controlled the message on that. And so, I think extreme positions on either side. Whether it be not having any students or not doing anything does not serve the US and it’s a win for China.

Manolis Priniotakis: It’s really remarkable to talk about a country carrying out fairly remarkable abuses of its own population across the board, but in particular in Xinjiang, right now, can be seen as winning the PR war. But have they won? Is it too late?

Anna Puglisi: I don't think it's too late. I'm an optimist. I think … I wouldn't count the US out. But I think that you know, as I said, we have to have these hard conversations. And we have to look clearly at what China's doing.

Manolis Priniotakis: Well, Anna Puglisi, thank you for the excellent conversation. We look forward to more of these hard conversations in the future. But thank you for being part of our inaugural season of Intelligence Jumpstart and for joining us with NIU today.

Anna Puglisi: No, thank you for having me. It's very interesting.

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Jane DOE: Thank you for listening to the Intelligence Jumpstart podcast. We'd love to hear from you about what you liked and what you'd like to hear more of. If you would like to hear more about a specific topic or issue, send us a note at NIPress@niu.odni.gov. To learn more about NIU visit our website at NI-U.edu.